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ARGUMENT

I.

Lancer has Failed to Address the Dispositive Language of the Medical
Emergency Statute.
a. Lancer's Explanation of the Medical Emergency Defense Does Not Address
the Dispositive Issue in this Case.

Initially, the Injured Parties note that they agree, by and large, with Lancer's
explanation of the law of the Medical Emergency Defense in Point I of its principal brief.
However, it is ~10re accurate to state that Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66 (Utah 1960),
~

Randle v. Allen, 862 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993), Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977 (Utah 1993),
and Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, 29 P .3d 638 involved the propriety of the so-called
unavoidable accident jury instruction. Notwithstanding, unavoidable accident and the
Sudden Incapacity Defense are related; the Sudden Incapacity Defense is a sub-specie of
unavoidable accident. In the end, the principle that emerges from these cases is that
although the unavoidable accident jury instruction is improper, a finding of no liability
can still be premised on a theory that a medical paralysis was unavoidable and that the
defendant therefore did not breach a duty:
[W]e explicitly direct trial courts to abandon the use of this
instruction hereafter. As we said in Randle:
Accidents do occur which might be unavoidable or for which the
defendant or defendants are not negligent. In such cases, if the state of
the evidence warrants it, the trial judge should direct a verdict, or the
jury, applying proper instruction the elements ofnegligence and
burden ofproof should find no liability.

Green, 2001 UT 62 at ~ 18 (emphasis of Randle found in Green).
The parties do not, however, agree that this common law principle applies in this

I

case because when the legislature enacts a statute in derogation of a principle or common
law, the common law yields. See Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, ii 7, 6 l P.3d 989
(citing Utah Code Ann.

*68-3-2( 1999) ("[t]hc rule of the common law that statutes in

derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the statutes of this
state. The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they
relate, and their provisions and all proceedings under them arc lo be liberally construed
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice.")), Schroeder
!nvs.. L. C. v. Edward\·, 20 I 3 lJ

!

25, ii 25, 30 I P.3d 994 ("Given the enactment of the []

statute, we arc no longer tasked with advancing public policy as we sec it. We instead
must implement the particular balance of policies reflected in the terms of [the] statute.
Those terms arc the law ... .'').
The dispositivc question before the court, then, is whether the enactment of Utah
Code Ann.

*31 A-22-303( I )(a)(v) effected the sort of preemption referenced by the

Gottling and 5,'chroeder courts and by Utah Code Ann.

~

68-3-2. To that end., the Injured

Parties reiterate that the controlling statutory terminology here is the term ··cover" found
in Subseclion ( I )(a)(v). Thus, this case requires the court lo determine if the legislature's
use

or the term "cover" stands in derogation of the otherwise correct principle of common

law reflected in Randle, Hansen, Porter~ and Green.
Lancer has not addressed the dispositive language. Instead, it relies on conclusory
statements that an unforesccably incapacitated driver's liability still hinges on a showing
of fault. See Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 17 (stating that "[t]here must still be a showing
of faulC~ without explaining why, and supporting the contention only with a ruling from a
2

state trial court judge in one of the personal injury lawsuits underlying the instant
declaratory action). Lancer also relies on demonstrably incorrect assertions that the
Medical Emergency Statute lacks language imputing liability to a medically incapacitated
driver. Compare Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 16 ("There is nothing in the statutory
language of either statute that addresses damages or directs the entry of personal liability
~

judgments against innocent drivers who suffer from medical incapacitation.") with Utah
Code Ann.§ 31A-22-303(l)(b) ("The d1"iver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) is
limited to the insurance coverage.") (emphasis added).
None of these statements attempt to interpret the term "cover" within the context
of the Medical Emergency Statute. Instead, Lancer assumes -without explaining why-

~

that the term "cover" means what it says it means. What's more, Lancer's conclusory
construction of "cover" occurs uncritically, sometimes in the sense of meaning #1 and
sometimes in the sense of meaning #3, never distinguishing between the two. Lancer's
uncritical, conclusory use of the dispositive word, therefore, does not help the court.
b. The Solorio Decisions and State v. Biggs Are Red Herrings.

Lancer also cites to a federal trial court's ruling and the I 0th Circuit's decision
affirming the trial court, contending that these cases establish that the Medical
(a)

Emergency Statute only requires an auto liability insurer to accept a specified risk. A
closer reading of those cases, however, discloses that neither court addressed the question
before this court, making their persuasive value dubious here.
Like the present case, Solorio I involved a motor vehicle accident where the
defendant contended that she experienced an unforeseeable medical paralysis that
3

resulted in an accident. Solorio v. United States, 228 F.Supp.2d 1280, 128 I (D. Utah
2002). Defendant retained multiple expert witnesses to opine lhat the driver most likely
experienced a first-time epileptic event that caused her to lose control of her vehicle and
strike the decedent. Id In response, the plaintiff designated a counter-expert who opined
that he was 99.9%, certain that the driver experienced the seizure c{fter the colJision and
that her seizure was the product of the impact. Id. at 1282. The plaintifrs expert,
however, conceded that he knew or no support in medical or scientific literature to
sup 1 ;ort his opinion, and conceded that he had never been involved in" similar case. Id.
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that the plaintifrs
expert's opinion did not pass muster under Fed. R. Ev. 702 and Dauhert v. Merrell /)ow
I'harmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, I 13 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 ( 1993 ).
Solorio, 218 F.Supp.2d al 1284-85. Because the plaintiff's expert's opinion amounted to

little more than speculation or ipse di.xii testimony, the opinion was ruled inadmissible.
Id. at 1285. Without expert testimony, plaintirfs were unable to raise a triable issue of fact

that the seizure occurred post-collision. Id. The trial court therefore die.I the only thing it
could do under those circumstances: it granted summary judgment in favor

or defendant.

Id.
Absent from the federal district court in Solorio is any discussion of Utah Code
Ann.

*31 A-22-303( I)(a)(v).

1

In fact, the only statute cited in the entire decision is the

1

The failure to cite to Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) is not surprising in view of
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Medical Emergency Statute (then codified at Utah Code Ann. § 3 IA-224

Federal Tort Claims Act for the proposition that the United States would be liable for its
torts to the extent a private litigant would be liable for the underlying motor vehicle
accident. Id. at 1282. It is therefore apparent that the trial court in Solorio did not
consider the Medical Emergency Statute, making the decision inapposite.
The 10th Circuit's decision is similarly unhelpful -which is not surprising
Qi

inasmuch as the issue in this case was never meaningfully raised in the trial court. The
deci~ion turned on Daubert and its progeny, and a rejection of plaintiff's due process
challenge. Solorio v. United States, 85 Fed.Appx. 705, 709-10 (10th Cir. 2004)
(unpublished opinion). Ultimately, the 10th Circuit held that summary judgment was
proper, for similar reasons as the trial court. Id at 711. Just as with the trial court's
decision, the 10th Circuit's decision made no mention of any portion of any the Medical
Emergency Statute. Thus, neither Solorio decision contributes to the discussion.
Lancer's reliance on State v. Biggs, 2007 UT App 261, 167 P.3d 544 is similarly
misplaced. The quoted passage from Biggs came in response to a criminal defendant's
contention on a motion to suppress evidence that Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22303( l )(a)(ii)(B) authorizes operator's insurance, so the stop based on the vehicle being
uninsured was a violation of his rights against unreasonable seizure of his person. Id. at ,r

~

15. The court rejected that argument, noting that "[t]his section, however, simply
specifies what coverage a vehicle insurance policy must include in order to satisfy the
Motor Vehicle Insurance Code requirements. It is therefore directed to insurance

303(l)(a)(iv)) was mentioned only in passing in a footnote, and lacked any real analysis
of the question before this court. See Addendum I.
5

r,

~

companies, and not vehicle owners, and in no way relieves Defendant of any other
statutory obligation she has to insure her car [pursuant lo Utah Code Ann. § 4 J - 12a30 l (2)( a)]." Id. Thal is,§ 41-l2a-301 puts the onus of providing insurance on the owner
of a vehicle, so upon learning that the vehicle was uninsured, a traffic slop was justified.

Id.
That question is quite different from the one before this court. And while Lancer
and the Biggs court correctly observe that § 33A-22-303 is directed to insurance
companies, that point docs not help Lancer's position becl1;1:;e the question here is not to ·
whom the mandate is directed. The question here is more fundamental than that. The
question here concerns the substance of the mandate, and not party to whom that mandate
is directed.
Thus, even though the decisions Lancer cites were rendered after the Medical
Emergency Statute's enactment, they do not involve the legal question before this court.
In reality, the question before the court is one on which, as observed hy Judge Parrish in
her certification order, there exists no controlling Utah law. R. 211. The court must
therefore interpret the term '"cover'' in the Medical Emergency Statute context as a matter
of first impression.
II.

Lancer's Uncritical Use of the Terms "Cover" and "Coverage" Leads to a
Failure to Observe Canons of Statutory Construction.
a. Lancer Has Failed to Observe the /11c/usio U11i11s est Excl11si11 Alteritts
Principle of Statutory Construction.

The Injured Parties have explained at length in their principal brief the various
meanings of "'cover" and Hcoverage" in the insurance law context, and will not rehash
6

those here. It is noteworthy, however, that Lancer uses the term interchangeably
throughout its principal brief, failing to acknowledge its different meanings in different
contexts. Compare, e.g., Lancer's Opening Brief at P. 14-15 (" ... statute at issue only
mandates what coverages are necessary for motor vehicle insurance policies.")(meaning
#1) with P. 15 ("As such, the Sudden Incapacity Defense bars coverage for the Injured
~

Parties in this case.")(meaning #3) and P. 25 ("This legislative enactment reflects public
policy requiring vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect
innocent victims of automobile accidents.")(quoting Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, ,I 42,

~

98 P.3d 28)(meaning #2). However, despite inadvertently demonstrating that the
dispositive statutory term "cover" carries more than one meaning in the context of tort
~

insurance law, Lancer makes no attempt to offer its own interpretation of "cover" or why
the court should apply it here.
Lancer's failure to consider this distinction leads it to its failure to recognize
statutory omissions and, in tum, its failure to observe the well-established canon of
statutory interpretation that the omission of a term is presumed to be intentional. See e.g.,

Carrier v. Salt Lake Cnty., 2004 UT 98, ,I 30, 104 P.3d 1208 ("[W]e should give effect to
any omission in [a statute's] language by presuming that the omission is purposeful.");
~

Biddle v. Wash. Terrace City, 1999 UT 110, ,I 14, 993 P.2d 875 ("[O]missions in
statutory language should be taken note of and given effect. ")(internal quotations
omitted). This principle, the Injured Parties respectfully submit, must apply a fortiori in
this case because the omitted term "insure" - found in every neighboring sub-subsection
in Subsection (1)-is a defined term. See Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-l-301(87).
7

Because Lancer docs not discuss the meaning of "cover" in this context, its
analysis necessarily overlooks the legislature's choice to depart from the use of the term
"insure," that was already found in the companion subsections to § 31 A-22-303 when
Subsection ( 1)(a)(v) was added by amendment. Similarly, Lancer assumes, without
explaining why, that "cover" should be construed to be synonymous with "insure'' by its
repeated assertion that the statute only requires an insurer to accept the risk associated
with medically incapacitated drivers. To illustrate: if, as Lancer insists, the Injured Parties
must first prove that Lancer'$ insureds were at fault before its policy must "cover" their
damages as Subsection ( I )(a)(v) mandates, then "cover" carries precisely the same
meaning as "'insure," found throughout the rest of Subsection (I). Thus, the failure to
consider what "cover" might mean in this context has precipitated Lancer's failure to
observe the principle

or e.,·1m·ssio uniu.\· est exclusio altcrius. This construction, being

inconsistent with established canons

or statutory construction, should be rejected.

In a closely related analytical naw, Lancer never addresses the legislative
omission of the concept of ""liability imposed by law" from Subsection ( I )(a)(v). Because
that clause appears in the neighboring, pre-existing subsections al the time Subsection
( I )(a)(v) was enacted, its omission from Subsection (l)(a)(v) leads to the presumption
that the legislature did not contemplate limiting Subsection ( I )(a)(v) to situations where
liability would be imposed by law. Instead, the Medical Emergency Statute contemplates
imposing an obligation on an insurer to cover damages its incapacitated driver causes,
whether the insured would be held liable at common law or not. Thus, even though the
phrase "strict liability" does not appear, strict liability is precisely what the legislature
8

described by omitting "liability imposed by law" from Subsection (1 )(a)(v). Lancer's
contention to the contrary is another violation of the expressio unius est exclusio alterius
principle and should be rejected for this reason as well.
b. Lancer's Construction Produces an Unacceptable Absurd Result.

In its argument that the Medical Emergency Statute only requires that insurers
~

accept the risk of injury flowing from an unforeseeable medical paralysis, Lancer
contends that "[t]here must still be a showing of fault." Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 17.
That is, according to Lancer; a plaintiff injured by an unforeseeably incapacitated driver
must prove that the driver was at fault in order to fall under the mandate of Utah Code
Ann. § 3 lA-22-303(1 )(a)(v).
The difficulty with this position manifests itself when one considers how the
statute might operate viz-a-viz an actual claim by an innocent, injured third party. As
Lancer explains in Point I of its principal brief, when a driver experiences a sudden
medical paralysis, the driver is not at fault because she did not breach her duty. See also
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-5-817(2) ("Fault means any actionable breach oflegal duty ... ").
Consider also that a liability insurer's obligation to provide coverage (meaning #3) to a
third party is derivative of its insured's legal liability. See e.g., R. 77. So when a driver

~

loses consciousness due to an unforeseeable medical condition and injures an innocent
third party as a result, the driver is not at fault as a matter of law. And even though the
driver's insurer provides coverage for damages flowing from the incapacity, the coverage

~

is not triggered unless the driver is at fault, which she is not. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B5-817(2). The Medical Emergency Statute therefore, according to Lancer, mandates a

9

coverage that covers exactly nothing.
In addition to creating an illusory coverage, this construction is antithetical to the
definition of insurance because the risk is not shifted between contracting parties, viz.,
insured and insurer. Instead, in a rather perverse irony, the risk is actually shifted from
the insured driver to a stranger to the contract of insurance: an innocent third party who
unfortunately finds herself in the wrong place at the wrong time. Contra Utah Code Ann.
§ 31 A-1-30 I (87). This construction, but for the lack of an underlying common law tort,
...,

would more closdy resemble a civil conspiracy than it docs insurance. Compare Esr,·ada
v. Al/endo::,a, 2012 UT App 82, ,1,1 13-14, 275 P.3d I 024 ,,vith Utah Code Ann. § 3 f J\-1-

30 I(87). This result is absurd by any measure and should be rejected for this reason as
well.
111.

Lancer's Argument Against Strict Liability Misses the Mark.

Lancer's third point actually includes two analytically distinct issues. First, Lancer
discusses public policy considerations appellate courts analyze when called upon to
expand the common law. Specifically, in Hammontree v. Jenner 20 Cal.App.3d 528, 530,
531-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist 197 I), the court declined to apply principles of strict
products liability in a case that involved a driver who experienced an unforeseeable
seizure that resulted in an injury-causing motor vehicle accident. This decision was, as
arc all common law-based decisions, grounded in that court's public policy judgments.
See id. So loo with Roman v. Estate <~/'Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422, ilil 2, 54 (Ohio 2003),

where the court declined to impose strict liability on a driver who experienced an
unforeseeable heart attack while driving that resulted in the death of two other third
10

parties.
Lancer then cites this court's decision in Graves v. Northeastern Services, Inc.,
2015 UT 28, 1 75, 345 P .3d 619 in support of its criticism of the Injured Parties' citation
to legislative history. Lancer then concludes by referring back to Hammontree and a law
review article on strict liability, arguing that public policy precludes expanding the rule of
strict liability to motor vehicle accident cases. See Lancer's Opening Brief PP. 17-25.

(ii

This argument conflates to analytically distinct points: I) expansion of the rule of
strict liability by common law; 2) the proper use of legislative history in questions ofstatutory construction. Neither of these points, however, is helpful. The first is unhelpful
because the Injured Parties have not requested an expansion of the rule of strict liability
~

to the present context as a matter of common law. 2 That question is not before the court.
So Hammontree and Roman are inapposite, as Lancer appears to concede: "Neither of
these cases involved any statutes, but only address the application of strict liability for a
driver's unforeseen loss of consciousness, resulting in injury, and in that context have
declined to apply strict liability." Id. at P. 18.
The second point is more deserving of the court's attention. Lancer correctly

2

Had the Injured Parties made this argument, it would be appropriate for this court, as the
final arbiter of the common law in the State of Utah, to weigh public policy
considerations. See e.g., Burton v. Exam Center Indus. & Gen. Med. Clinic, Inc., 2000
UT 18 at 17, 994 P.2d 1261 ("We must therefore decide whether a public policy exists
justifying the creation of a common law cause of action .... "). Instead, the Injured Parties
maintain that the legislature has enacted a statute in derogation of the common law, so
this court's review is constrained to interpreting the statute in question. See Gottling,
2002 UT 95 at 1 7 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-2(1999)), Schroeder Invs 2013 UT 25
at 125.

11

observes this court's skepticism over resorting io legislative history in questions of
statutory interpretation, and its preference to ground its decisions in the language of the
statute where possible. See Schroeder Investments, 2013 UT 25 at ii 23 ("In a case like
this one where the statute speaks directly to the issue before us ... , the statute is
supreme."), Graves, 1015 UT 28 at ii 67 ("as our recent decisions have emphasized, the
governing law is defined not by our abstract sense of legislative purpose, but by the
statutory text that survived the constitutional process of bicameralism and presentment."),
':' j
tj
State v. Clark, 2011 UT 23, ii J 7, 25 I P.3d 829 ("Any su~.•:)ositions about what. the
legislature may have intended cannot properly override what it actua11y did.'~), Orlando
/vlillcnia. LC v. United Title Servs. D_l Utah, Inc., 2015 UT 55, ii 71, 355 P.3d 965. In

essence, Lancer intimates that the f njured Parties have cherry-picked quotations from the
floor debates that support their preferred construction. Or, to borrow Judge Leventhal 's

metaphor, Lancer suggests the Injured Parties have looked over a crowd of people in
search of their friends. See Patricia M. Wald, Some Ohscrvations on the Use ,f
Legislative Histm~v in the I 98 / Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195, 2) 4 ( 1983 ).

What Lancer has failed to do is substantiate the suggestion or cherry-picking with
portions of legislative history suggestive of a contrary intent, possibly because such a
contrary intent is not to be found. As discussed in the Injured Parties' principal brief, the
bill encountered no meaningful resistance and required very little discussion, either in
committee or on the floor of either legislative body prior to being approved by both
houses and signed into law. Indeed, the Injured Parties' research into legislative history
disclosed no contrary intent, and certainly Lancer has not cited this court to any.
12

But the more salient point is that the Injured Parties do not cite to legislative
history in the hope that the court will impose an intent not manifest in the statute's plain
language, nor do the Injured Parties urge that the court use legislative history to influence
its plain language construction of the statute. The point is to illustrate legislative intent in
the event the court concludes that the Medical Emergency Statute language is ambiguous
~

-which the Injured Parties maintain it should not do for reasons articulated above and in
greater detail in their principal brief. However, in cases where the court finds a statute
ambiguous, it is proper to resort to means of secondary construction, including legislative
history. LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39,126, 337 P.3d 254. Thus, should the court decide
that the statute contains an ambiguity that cannot be resolved by an appeal to primary
sources (viz., the language of the statute itself, context, neighboring subsections, etc ... ),
an appeal to legislative history is appropriate.
Thus, Lancer's arguments against expanding the common law miss the mark. The
Injured Parties have not asked this court to expand the common law rule of strict liability.
The plain language of the Medical Emergency Statute discloses that the legislature has
imposed strict liability in this context by statute.

IV.

The Plain Language of the Medical Emergency Statute Contains an
Important Cue that the Legislature Intended it to Supplant the Common
Law Rule Expressed in Randle, Porter, Hansen, and Green.

Further support for the Injured Parties' construction of the Medical Emergency
Statute is found in the challenged jury instruction in Porter. But to understand why this
portion of the plain language supports the Injured Parties' construction, the court must
recall that core of the Sudden Incapacity Defense is a contention that the driver did not
13

have reasonable notice of the onset of the condition. This is another iteration of the
concept of foreseeability in the context of the breach element. See Jeff.s· v. West, 20 I2 UT
11, ii 26, 275 P.3d 228 (noting that foreseeability analysis within the breach element asks
whether, under the facts of the case, the defendant conducted herself as a reasonably
prudent person would). Thus, when the Sudden Incapacity Defense in in play, the real
contention is that the defendant did not breach a duty.
That concept was iterated in Porter. Like this case, Porter involved an injury that
arose from a driver's unforeseeable medical incapacity. Porter, 355 P.2d at 67. In
addition to the unavoidable accident instruction, the jury was given an instruction on the
Sudden Incapacity Defense:
A driver of an automobile who is stricken by paralysis, seized by a fit
or otherwise rendered unconscious and who still continues to drive
while unconscious and causes damages or injury to another cannot be
held responsible therefor unless he 11,•as rca.,·onah~l' aH'at-c that he was
ahout to lose consciousness to the extent that a person <~{ordina,y
prudence l,vould not attempt to continue drh·ing.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).

This specific instruction was later disavowed in Randle. Rane/le, 862 P.2cl at 1336.
Randle did not, however, change substantive law. Id. ("Of course, accidents do occur

which might be unavoidable or for which the defendant or defendants are not negligent.
In such cases, if the state of the evidence warrants it, the trial judge should direct a
verdict, or the jury, applying proper instructions on the elements of negligence and
burden of proof, should find no liability."). Thus, the Porter instruction indicates that
when an unforeseeable medical paralysis occurs, the defendant has not breached a duty

14
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and is not liable. By extension, the defendant's insurer has no obligation to provide
coverage (meaning #3) to an injured party. See e.g., Lancer's Opening Brief, P. 15 ("As
such, the Sudden Incapacity defense bars coverage for the Injured Parties in this case.").
So under the rule as stated in Porter, a liability insurer would have no obligation to
pay damages sustained as a result of the insured driver's unforeseeable incapacitating
~

event while driving. See e.g., R. 77. Thus, the insurer would not be required to cover
those damages (meaning #3).
With that in mind, it is significant that the Medical Emergency Statute adopts tLe
operative language from the Porter instruction that previously defeated the insured
driver's liability and, by extension, the insurer's obligation to cover that liability:
a policy of motor vehicle liability coverage ... shall ...
cover damages or injury resulting from a covered driver of a motor
vehicle who is stricken by an unforeseeable paralysis, seizure, or other
unconscious condition and who is not reasonably aware that
paralysis, seizure, or other unconscious condition is about to occur to
the extent that a person of ordina1J1 prudence would not attempt to
continue driving.
Utah Code Ann.§ 31A-22-303(l)(a)(v) (emphasis added). Thus, by mandating that
insurers must "cover" a class of damages that they were not required to cover previously
under Porter, the legislature contemplated that the term "cover" would impose liability
where it did not exist previously.
This is a further plain language cue that the legislature's intent was to impose

~

liability where it did not exist previously. And even further support of this construction is
found in Subsection (l)(b), which expressly contemplates an insured driver's liability,

15

and caps her liability at the applicable policy limits in effect at the time of the accident.
Lancer's construction to the contrary is therefore inconsistent with the plain language of
the statute and should be rejected. The court should instead adopt the construction of the
statute propounded by the Injured Parties.
V.

Lancer's Argument that the Injured Parties' Recovery is Capped at
Statutory Minimum Requirements is an Academic Question.

In the Injured Parties' principal brief: they contended that if the court construed
Subse~ifon ( I )(b,1 ?o limit their recovery

the ,ipplicablc statutory minimJn~, limits, die

court should apply the correct minimums, which the Injured Parties stated to be
$750,000.00.

While the Injured Parties persist in their bcl ief that the court should apply the
correct statutory minimum, their citation to $750,000 is not the correct statutory

r:.:-,.

~

minimum requirement. Thal minimum requirement applies lo motor carriers not
operating for-hire. See Utah Admin. Code R.909-1-3. There is no dispute in this case that
the motor carrier was operating for-hire. Thus, the Injured Parties concede that R909-13(2) docs not apply.

The correct minimum statutory requirement is established as follows: The
department of transportation is statutorily authorized to incorporate minimum insurance
requirements stated in the Code or Federal Regulations. Utah Code Ann. § 72-9-103(a).
Pursuant to this grant of administrative authority, such a rule was enacted. See Utah
Adm in. Code R909-1-1 (stating that rule 909-1 is enacted under authority of Utah Code
Ann. § 72-9-103 ), R909- I-2 C'Safety Regulations for Motor Carriers, 49 CFR ... Parts
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387 through 399 ... are incorporated by reference .... "). The applicable federal
regulations require that any vehicle with a seating capacity of 16 passengers or more is
required to carry at least $5,000,000.00 in liability insurance. 49 CFR § 387.33. Thus, if
the court is persuaded that minimum statutory insurance requirements apply, the correct
minimum insurance amount is $5,000,000.00. And while the record on appeal does not
~

contain a reference to the policy limits in place for Lancer's insured driver, the Injured
Parties represent to the court that the policy limits in effect on the date of the underlying
accident is $5,000,000.00. Thus, whether the Injured Pmiies are correct that actual policy
limits govern, or whether Lancer is correct that minimum policy limits requirements
govern, the result in this case is the same: the proper cap of Lancer's insured driver's
liability is $5,000,000.00.
Nevertheless, the Injured Parties submit that Lancer's contention that an
incapacitated driver's liability is capped at the applicable minimum statutory
requirements is not well-taken. In support of this contention, Lancer cites to several cases
decided under other portions of Utah Code Ann. § 3 lA-22-303 and urges this court to
draw an analogy from these cases to the present case and cap the Injured Parties'
recovery at statutory minimum requirements. These cases, however, do not support

~

Lancer's request.
But before considering the analytical flaws manifest in reliance on those cases, it
should be observed that Lancer's argument on Question #2 lacks support in the plain

~

language of the statute, which limits "[t]he driver's liability under Subsection (l)(a)(v) ..
. to the insurance coverage." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(l)(b). To accept Lancer's
17

construction, the court must construe Hthe insurance coverage/' to refer to the statutory
minimum requirements stated in Utah Code Ann. § 31 A-22-304, despite the lack of
language supportive of that conclusion. The more logical interpretation is that "the
insurance coverage" refers to the insured driver's liability coverage in effect at the time
of the accident, if for no other reason than because it exists in a subsection dedicated to
the drivcr''s motor vehicle liability insurance. Furthermore, Subsection ( I )(b)
contemplates a driver who experiences the unforeseeable medical condition, and her
Ji~

liabiiity under Subsection ( I ){a)(v). Id. Given that, the clause "the insur~:ncc coveragen
most logicaJly contemplates the insurance coverage of the driver who experiences the
incapacitating event that is in effect when her liability under Subsection ( J ){a)(v) arises.
Plain language analysis, therefore, betrays Lancer~s failure to consider what is
apparent on the face

or the statute~ and obviates the need to consider the case law Lancer

relics on in its answer to Question #2.
But even if the court considers the cases Lancer cites, Lancer's position still lacks
support. For example, in SiJeros the court relied on the statutory requirement to provide
insurance for liability imposed by law and observed that the statute did not distinguish
between negligence liability and intentional tort liability. Speros, 2004 UT 69 at ,I 43.
Thus, to the extent the policy exclusion was inconsistent with the statute"s mandate, the
exclusion was unenforceable. See id. at ii 44. However, because Utah Code Ann.§ 31A22-304 only mandates the minimum policy limits, the intentional acts exclusion was not

disturbed for any portion of the policy limits that exceeds the ininimum requirements. Id.
The holding in Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 619
18

P.2d 329 (Utah 1980) is functionauy identical, only it involved the validity of a nameddriver exclusion. Id at 331. The analysis and result are otherwise identical. Id. at 333.
The analysis and holding was slightly different in Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P .2d
231 (Utah 1985), where the court invalidated the household exclusion entirely because
the No-Fault Act only authorized exclusions for intentional self-injury and for damages
caused while committing a felony. Id at 234. Because the household exemption did not
fall in either category, it was held to be an impermissible exclusion and therefore
unenforceable. Id.
The common thread to these cases is the statutory invalidation of an exclusion
from coverage under an insurance contract. Speros, 2004 UT 69 at ,r 43; Allstate, 619
P.2d at 332, 33, Call, 712 P.2d at 234. The principles stated therein are therefore
principles of contract law. See e.g., Mellor v. Wasatch Crest Mut. Ins. Co., 2009 UT 5, ,r
7, 201 P .3d 1004 ("An insurance policy is a contract between the insured and the
insurer." (citing Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, ,r 4, 133 P.3d 428)). This case,
by contrast, does not involve a question of contract law. Instead, it involves the statutory
modification of principles of tort law, as explained above and in the Injured Parties'
principal brief. Because the law of contract and the law of tort are fundamentally
~

different, there is little in Speros, Allstate, or Call that can or should inform the court's
decision here.
There is, however, a passing similarity between the results in those cases and how
the Medical Emergency Statute functions in this case. As a result of Subsection (1 )(b ),
the incapacitated driver's legal liability imposed by Subsection (l)(a)(v) is capped at her
19

limits of insurance in effect at the time of the accident. Thus, it is conceivable that a
plaintiffs damages could exceed the defendant's liability exposure, allowing the plaintiff
to enforce the excess portion of the judgment against the defendant ·s personal assets
through a variety of means. See, e.g.. Utah R. Cir. Pro. 64 et seq. (writs), Utah Code Ann.
§ 788-5-20 Jet seq. (judgment liens). That similarity, however, is superficial because

neither Speros nor Allstate modified the insured driver's underlying tort liability; both
cases only modified the insurer's contractual obligations vis-a-vis its insured's underlying
;f ~

tort liability.
By contrast, under the Medical Emergency Statute, ~lhc driver's liability under
4

Subsection ( I )(a)(v) is limited to the insurance coverage.H Utah Code Ann.

*31 A-22-

30.1( I )(b ). Subsection ( I )(b) therefore modifies the insured driver's legal liability -in
potentially enormous ways, given the catastrophic nature of the type of accidents that can
result from a driver's sudden incapacity, and given how many drivers on Utah's roads
carry only statutory minimum policy limits. So despite the superficial similarity in the
results, the legal principles in operation arc quite different.
The end result is that Lanccr~s attempt to limit the Injured Parties' recovery is an
artificial attempt to impose a restriction on the Injured Parties' rights of recovery in a
manner contrary to the plain language of the statute. The statute's plain language
therefore caps the Injured Parties' recovery at the policy limits in effect at the time of the
accident in question, and not the statutory minimum $25,000/$65,000.
II

20
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CONCLUSION

Lancer's analysis does not address the dispositive statutory language. It instead
relies on conclusory statements and case law that does not address the question before the
court. Additionally, the statute contains additional plan language cues that support the
Injured Parties' construction of the statute. The court should therefore answer Question
;,i)

#1 in the affirmative.
With respect to Question #2, Lancer's position is not well-taken. It relies on case
law that produces a facially similar result, but does so for significantly different legal
reasons. Lancer overlooks the different legal reasons, resulting in an attempt to apply
principles of contract law to a statute that modifies principles of tort law. Rather than

~

entertain this construction, the court should follow the plain language of Subsection
(1 )(b) and hold that the Injured Parties' maximum recovery is the policy limits in effect

on the date of the accident.
Finally, if the court is persuaded on Question #2 that statutory minimum
requirements govern the Injured Parties' maximum recovery, it should apply the correct
minimum insurance requirement, which happens to be the same as the actual policy limits
in effect at the time of the accident underlying this case.
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for Plaintiffs

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

rc.·:l\CI SOLORIO as pc~rsonal
rez.--,:ces ntat ive of the estate
of MIG EL ORNELAS SOLORIO;
FILIBE TO JIMENEZ and ADELEDA
ORELAS SOLORIO as heirs of
decedent MIGUEL ORNELAS

•:~-!

PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

SOLORI1,

I

Plaintiffs,

vs.
Civil No. 2:0l-CV-0002SK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Magistrate Judge Ronald N. Boyce
Defendant.

Introduction

Te defendant United States of America has moved this court
for su mary judgment.

It asserts that the plaintiffs have not

establ · shed any negligence; that the undisputed facts show that its
employ e was not negligent; and, that a private party would not be
held n gligent under the same circumstances.
T [e

case.

plaintiffs have stated a
there is a

It is mistaken.

clear prima facie negligence

classic factual dispute as to the

defenda t's defense of sudden incapacitation.

Finally,

in Utah,

\

~
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given
to

he identical cir~~mstances, a private party would be liable
plaintiffs

in

this

action. 1

Thus,

there

are

no

circum tances under which summary judgment is appropriate.

Disputed and Undisputed Facts

its statement of undisputed facts, the United States has
gone

r beyond a statement of facts.

A significant portion of its

nt is factual argument that goes completely to the weight of
the te tirnony rather than being ~..mdisputed fac't.

Thus, rather than

to separate factual arguments in a closing argument
style,

plaintiff disputes the defendant's statements 18-18.

Undis

Facts

1.

April

16,

1999,

a

van owned by the

Bureau of

Land

nagement, United States Department of Interior, was driven
its employee Susan L. Michel in the course and scope of her
(The defendant I s admitted answers, Answer to
9 - 12 , Exh . 1) .

2.

ile driving north on State Street, Ms. Michel veered to the
out

of

the

travel

lane,

and

into

a

sidewalk

zone where she struck and killed Miguel Solorio.
he defendant's admitted answers, Answer to Complaint~ 10-12
• 1) .

3•

llowing the collision,

Ms.

Michel was found in her car

n Utah, a driver is liable to an injured party even where
that i jury is caused by some sudden incapacitating event such as
a hear attack, seizure, etc. U.C.A. §31A-22-303(1) {a) (iv).
-2-
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h ving what appeared to be a ~~izure.

(Deposition of Richard

bert at pg 9-12).

Dis

d Facts

4.

. Fumisuke Matsuo, a board-certified neurologist and expert
w'tness for the defendant has opined that Ms. Michel had an
seizure-like event while driving which caused the
(Matsuo deposition at pg. 7, Exh. 2) .
. Phillip Savia, a board-certified neurologist and expert

5.

w'tness for the plaintiff t~stified that he is 99.99%
certain
~,;at Ms. Michel did not have a seizure while driving.
opines

that

the

trauma

from

the

Rather,

collision caused her

Deposition at pg. 25, Exh. 3).
Argument
POINT I
he Plaintiff Has Established Prima Facie Negligence

I9

its motion,

the United States asserts that the plaintiff

has not established each element of a prima facie negligence case.
Its

that a plaintiff must prove a negligent reason for

a

negligent

defe dant's

conduct.

This

mistaken

assertion,

if

accept d, would add an additional element of negligence that does
not
the defendant pointed out,
neglig
Braith

duty,

breach

of

West Vallev Cit

in Utah, the only elements of
duty,

causation,
921

1996} .

-3-

and

P.2d 997,

damages.
999

(Utah
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e defendant has admitted that it owed a duty of care to the

The United States admits that the United States, the
Bureau of Land Management, and Susan L. Michel owed
Mr. Solorio a duty of care. . . (Defendant I s Answer to
Complaint, Exh. 1).
wever, in order to examine the defendant's conduct, it is
ry to establish what duties were owed.
by both statut;._e and the common-law.

These duties are
Statutes that are

to protect plaintiffs from a particular type of harm

d

a duty of care. Day v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Safety,
980 P. d 1171 (Utah 1999).

Additionally, the common law imposes a

duty of reasonable care on all people.
7

there are numerous statutes and common-law doctrines
specific duties of care.

For example:

e operator of a vehicle shall exercise ~are to avoid
c lliding with any pedestrian. U.C.A.
§ 41-6-80.
person shall drive any vehicle on a
s'dewalk area. U.C.A. § 41-6-106.1

N

sidewalk or

a roadway divided into two or more clearly marked
nes for traffic ... (1) a vehicle shall be operated as
arly as practical entirely within a single lane until
e operator has determined that the movement can be made
s fely. § 41-6-61.
0

345

(Utah 1959).

re,
that

Hadley v. Wood.

use reasonable care to keep [her] car under
Wardel v. Jerman, 423 P.2d 485 (1976).

-4-
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BREACH OF·DUTY
Utah, a violation of the standards of safety set by statute
or

on-law is prima facie evidence of negligence.

Smith, 404 P.2d 659,

661

(1965).

Klafta v.

This widely held principle has

en accepted by the Federal Court interpreting Utah law.
United States,

288 F.Supp.

245

(D.

Utah 1968).

The

Supreme Court eloquently described the principle at
work
... No mat.ter how t.l-ie defendant founr" herself in the wrong
it was
h r obligation to explain what she was doing there, and
h w she got there ... When a motorist is on his right side
o
the highway, obeying all the rules of the highway,
bing careful, cautious and considerate of the rights of
hers, and suddenly he sees coming toward him like a
rgantuan genie, a destroying force, it is not for him
explain how and why the invader got into his way.
rtainly a pedestrian on the sidewalk, when he is struck
a car which skids from the highway onto the sidewalk,
i juring him, is not required by t.he law to employ
m chanics to inspect the invading vehicle, surveyors to
m~asure the distances, and to look for witnesses to
t~stify to the undue speed, mechanical difficulties or
odher causes for the intruder's violent trespassing.
Cm bell v. Fiorot 191 A.2d 657, 659 (Pa 1963) (emphasis

1 ne, she was whe·ce she had no rigbt to be, and

a ded) .

H

prima facie breach of duty is clear.

to the plaintiff's complaint,

the United States admitted to the

conduct which breached the duties.
conduc

In its answer

In addition, it also cited that

in its memorandum in support of it motion:

T. e

United States admits that Susan L. Michel was an
loyee of the Bureau of Land Management and was driving
an owned by the United States government and that the
v
veered to the ri ht into the construction zone
strikin the decedent.
(Defendant's Answer 1 10, Exh.
1) . (Emphasis added).
e
a

-5-
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@

*

*

*

*

*

e United States admits that the van continued through
e construction cite and dragged Mr. Solorio after
tting him. (Defendant's Answer 111, Exh. 1).

*

cording to Ms. Warnick, the van 'looked like [it] was
ing to make a sudden turn' to the right, and ended up
tting a dirt pile, a cement barrier, and Mr. Solorio.
efendant's Memorandum Pg. 3, 1 5).
is conduct clearly breached the statutory and common-law
standa ds of care cited above.

Ms. Michel lost control of the van.

She al owed it to l~ave the marked lane and drive into the sidewalk

constr ction area.
Based

n

the

There she hit and killed a Miguel Solorio.

applicable duties and the admitted evidence,

the

plaint ffs have established a prima facie case of negligence.

POINT I I

The Defendant Has the Burden to
Prove Its Affirmative Defense
though the plaintiff has stated a prima facie negligence
case,

defendant's negligent conduct may be subject to an excuse

or

ification.

Platis at 262, quoting Klafta at 661.

or

ification for a negligent act is an affirmative defense.

Lei

urniture and Ca

et v. Isom

alleging that Ms.

Michel

Excuse

657 P.2d 293, 302 (Utah 1982).

had a

seizure that

caused an

t, the United States has raised an affirmative defense which
that her negligent acts should be excused.

This is an

nt sequence because the United States bears the burden of

-6-

t
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both p eading and proving its affirmative defense. Sea},, v. Gowan,
923 P. d 1361,1363 {Utah 1996).

Moreover, it has the burden of

each element of its defense. Id.
e United States has claimed that Ms. Michel had a seizure
that

c used

the

accident.

This

tive defense to negligence.
it

is

a

Malcolm v.

common-law

the loss of consciousness

Pa tick 14 7 So2d 188

sudden incapacity defense,

known,

Throughout the United States,

is known by a variety of names:

de fens ,

well

Smi..t.h_Y.

(Fla.

Garrett,

1962) ;

the

SE2d 775

{NC

App.
230

..,

1977); the act of god defense, Christensen

V.

Gammons, 197 A2d

•·150

(DC 19 4); and also, the unavoidable accident defense, Porter v.
Price, 355 P.2d 66 (Utah 1960).
I

order to establish the defense the United States must prove

!1)

that:

Ms. Michel suffered a loss of consciousness or medical

condit~on that prevented her from controlling the van.
Blair,

Goodrich v.

1

646 P.2d 890 {Ariz. App. 1982), VanderHout v. Johnson, 446
(Oregon 1968) .

Id.

at Malcom.

(2)

That the loss of

consci usness occurred before the alleged negligent act.

Arthur v.

Royse, 574 SW2d 22 (Mo App 1978), Kohler v. Sheffert, 96 NW2d 911
(Iowa 1959). (3) That the unconsciousness was unforeseeable. Walker
v. Cardwell, 348 So2d 1049 (Ala. 1977).
T

s, by introducing deposition testimony of Dr. Matsuo, the

United

has offered evidence in support of its affirmative

defens

Based on its analysis of the case law, it concludes that
idence satisfies its burden and that it is entitled to

summar

judgment.

However, it's analysis and conclusions are in
-7-
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ecause it has misread both the context of the cases and the
d burdens of proof.
States relies heavily on Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d
In alluding to Porter, the United States makes an

66

rted and errant statement of Utah law.

1

It asserts that:

der Utah law, a sudden and unforeseeable loss of
c nsciousness rendering a driver unable to control a
tor vehicle does not constitute negligence, because it
i volves circumstances beyond the control of the
r asonable person. Defendant Memorandum at pg.9.
This

not the law in Utah.

Porter actually stands for the

!

i

sudden unconsciousness may relieve a tortfeasor
ponsibility for his negligent actions.
Court upheld a jury verdict.

In Porter, the Utah

In response to a prima facie

nee case, the defendant raised the affirmative defense of a
diabetic seizure and the case was submitted to a jury.

The jury

found t ere was no negligence and the case was appealed because of
instruction.

In Utah this case could not be settled on

judgment.
Porter was the first in long line of Utah cases
with unavoidable accidents and jury instruction. 2 However,
in
Kusy v. K-Mart Apparel Fashion Corp., 681 P.2d 1232,
1237 ( tah 1984); Anderson v. Toone, 671 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah
1983}; nderton v. Mont ome , 607 P.2d 828, 833 (Utah 1980);
Strin am v. Broderick, 529 P.2d 425 (Utah 1974); Ellis v.
Hathaw , 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen 482 P.2d 702,
705 (1971); Calahan v. Wood, 465 P.2d 169 (1970); Woodhouse v.
Johnso, 436 P.2d 442, 444-45 (1968); Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d
701, 70
(1961); Porter v. Price, 355 P.2d 66, 67-68 (1960};
Steele . Wilkinson, 349 P.2d 1117, 1119 (1960); Alvarez v.
Paulus, 333 P.2d 633, 635 (1959); Best v. Huber, 281 P.2d 208,
209 (19 5) .
-8~

I

ase 2:0l-cv-00025-DAK Document 36 Filed 08/28/02 Page 9 of 15

Court

verruled all these previous cases, and stated that the i.YJ::y

must

operly apply the elements of negligence. Id. at 1335 36.
United States also relies on Cruz v.
987 F.Supp. 1299 (D. Haw. 1997).

United States of

There, a postal worker

a pedestrian when he lost control of his truck because of
Yet there, the plaintiff did not allege negligent
of the car.

Rather, he alleged that the defendant was

in not seeing a doctor and that he should have pulled
over

fore his heart attack.
reover,

like Porter,

the critica.i. distinction in Cruz is

that

was not a summary judgment.

court'

trial

decision as

the

fact

The Cruz decision was the
finder based on completely

differ nt allegations of negligence.
the United States cited and attached Langland v.
United , States of America,

2 002

WL

22 5 93 7

Mass.

(D.

2 002) .

In

Langladd, the undisputed facts established that the defendant had

a brai~ tumor and that
I

accide1~·

the tumor caused his symptoms and the

The only thing at issue was the third element of the

uncons,1ousness

defense:

was

the

undisputed

unconsciousness

forese,able?
Foreseeability
causation.

is

an

Unforeseeable

element

of

Conseguences,

duty
pg.

and/or
280,

proximate

Prosser and

Keeton

n Torts 5 th Edition (1988).

it is

sually examined by a court as a matter of law.

~'

the

foreseebbil i ty
I

court
and

examined

the

the

undisputed

-9-

Viewed as an element of duty,

evidence

as

it

unconsciousness

Id.

In

related

to

and

entered
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judgment.
re, in contrast, the unconsciousness is disputed.
the

pl inti ff

established a

prima

facie

negligence

Moreover,
case.

In

e, the defendant offered some evidence on its affirmative
of sudden incapacitation.
contradicted

is

by

Yet, that speculative offering

the

plaintiffs

evidence.

nt' s offering is not enough to warrant summary judgment.

The
It

is mer ly a factual argument to be submitted to the fact finder at
trial

s happened in ?orter a n d ~ POINT I I I

There

s a Question of Fact As to When Susan Michel Had a Seizure

summary judgment,

a court must view all the facts and

justif'able inferences from those facts in a light most favorable
nonmoving party.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S.

242,

its motion, the defendant offered the deposition testimony
of Dr.

atsuo to support its contention that Ms. Michel suffered a
prior to

the

accident.

Unfortunately,

the

defendant

ed to inform the court of the opposing evidence offered by
intiff 1 s expert neurologist:
. Swent:

How certain are you that Susan Michel did
not have a seizure before the accident?

Savia:

I'm fairly certain that she did not have
a seizure prior to the accident.
I'm going to ask you to put a number on
it.
Over 50 percent.
-10-
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Swent:

Do you have a precise number?

Savia:

I would probably say 99.99 percent.

Swent:

You're pretty certain?

Savia:

Yes.

of Dr. Philip S. Savia M.D. Pg. 25, Exh. 3)
e defendant's neurologist says that Ms. Michel had a seizure

before the accident and that the seizure caused the accident.
O
had a

the other hand, the plaintiff's neurologist says that she
eizure because of the trauma in the accident and that the

~ccide t

caused the seizure.
is

T

a

classic

affirm tive defense.

question

of

fact

on

the

defendant's

Summary judgment must be denied.
POINT IV

Dr.

ilip Savia Is Qualified to Testify As an Expert Witness

T~l

United

qualif ed to

States

testify as

has

suggested

that

an expert witness.

Dr.
This

Savia

is

not

suggestion is

errone us.
T

States asserts that Dr. Savia is not qualified to

~estif

because he stated in his deposition that he was not an

expert

n epilepsy.

First,

he fact that an expert witness indicates that he is not an

This argument is misplaced for many reasons.

expert tn a topic, or that another person is more of an expert on
the toJic, has no bearing on the admissibility of the testimony.
The medical definition of the word expert, and the legal definition
of the

ord expert, are significantly different.

-11-
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a court ca~inot delegate to an expert its duty to
the law. Molecular Technology Corp. v. Valentine, 925
919 (CA6 1991).

must

decide

Thus, the court, not Dr. Savia or Dr.

whether Dr.

Savia is

a

qualified expert

there is no evidence in this case that Ms. Michel has
y or a seizure disorder.
\@

Even the defendant's expert refers

lleged seizure as a seizure-like event.

to

The issue is one

tential seizure. The logical medical specialty to consult

o[

would

neurology.

Thus,

any

board-certified

neurologist

•:/4

posses es the knowledge, skill, training, experience, and education
Federal Rules to render an opinion about seizures.
B

neurol
seizur

Dr.

Savi a

and

Dr.

Matsuo

are

board

certified

Both are qualified to treat patients that have
seizure disorders.

Both do in fact treat seizure

The fact that they have chosen different sub-specialties
within

eurology is irrelevant to admissibility.

Labs , 7 8 0 F . 2 d . 14 7 , 15 5 ( 1 st Cir . 19 8 5) .

Payton v. Abbott

Specialization goes to

the we'ght of the testimony, not admissibility.

Id.

Thus, Dr.

Savia is qualified to render his opinion on the alleged seizure.
POINT IV
If Dr. Savia'e Testimony Is Speculative, So Too Is Dr. Matsuo's
and Dr. Caravati's.
T

defendant asserts that the Dr. Savia is speculating when

he opi es that the seizure was caused by impact trauma.

-12-

However,
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is unsupported.
discus

The defendant offers z:.) evidence,

or analysis for its claim.

Thus,

the court should

ignore the defendant's claim entirely.

H wever, if the court considers the argument, it should also
Matsuo

view

and

Dr.

Caravati's

opinions

using

the

same

standa

If Dr. Savia's testimony is speculative, then both of

the de

expert opinions are also clearly speculative, and

Conclusion

Tjis is a case where the plainti=f has established a prima
facie case of negligence.

In response, the defendant has raised

an affirmative defense of sudden incapacitation.

It has now

asked this court to enter a summary judgment on that defense.
Howeve, summary judgment cannot be entered because there is a
classic factual dispute as to that affirmative defense.

Respectfully submitted this

day of August 2002,

ROBERT J. DEBRY

&

ASSOC.

Ci)

:

I
I
I
I

arren W. Driggs
J. Bradford DeBry

11scr'1wps10.-c/b1 adis l111io/pluppu,c.brf wpd
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